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AESCHYLUS' LAW
Paul Gewirtz*
Practitioners of "law and literature," a newly fashionable area of
legal scholarship, are rarely concerned with literature at all. They
have generally focused instead on literary criticism, seeking to apply
current theories about interpreting literary texts to the judicial enter-
prise of interpreting legal texts.1 Much interesting work has been
done in this vein, although there probably has been too little emphasis
on the differences between judicial action and literary criticism, dif-
ferences that limit the usefulness of analogies between one field and
the other.2 I am more interested, though, in efforts to augment the
"law and literature" movement with work that explores the relevance
to law of literature itself, not only literary criticism. I cannot claim
to know how fruitful such work will ultimately be, but we have barely
begun to examine the images of law that appear in literature and to
assess whether they illuminate the legal world in distinctive ways. 3
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am very grateful to Sheila Murnaghan, H. Jefferson
Powell, and Catherine Weiss for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
I See, e.g., Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns
of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 676 (1979); Symposium: Law and Literature, 6o TEX.
L. REv. 373 (1982) (articles by Stanley fish, Ronald Dworkin, Sanford Levinson, and others);
Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. I (1985); Fish, Working on the Chain Gang:
Interpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 271
(,V. Mitchell ed. 1983).
2 What is at stake when judges construe a legal text is how they will wield governmental
power over us and the legitimacy of exercising that power; when critics interpret literature, on
the other hand, they usually wield no state power and the consequences of any particular reading
are generally very small indeed. The fact that power over others is so immediately at stake
helps explain why judges view themselves as less free than literary critics to devise novel and
individualistic readings of legal texts, but instead usually feel a heightened obligation to give
legal texts a meaning rooted in sources external to themselves - for example (to mention just
the most typical one), in the purposes or intentions of the legislature that framed the text and
whose right to exercise power over others is usually clear. Cf. Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance,
92 YALE L.J. 585, 666-68 (1983) (discussing different norms within the legal and literary
cultures).
3 For examples of work along this line, see B. JOHNSON, Melville's Fist, in THE CRITICAL
DIFFERENCE: ESSAYS IN THE CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC OF READING 79 (1980); R. WEISBERG,
THE FAILURE OF THE WORD (1984); Coles, Charles Dickens and the Law, 59 VA. Q. REv. 564
(1983); Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REV. 179 (1985);
and Reich, The Tragedy of Justice in Billy Budd, 56 YALE REV. 368 (1967). Cardozo's essay,
"Law and Literature," in B. CARDozo, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (1931),
discusses the literary and rhetorical style of judicial opinions, and thus falls into another category,
"law and literature" in the sense that judicial opinions and other legal activities are treated as
"literary" efforts; an influential present-day work in this category is J. WHITE, THE LEGAL
IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973). Other
noteworthy writings in the "law and literature" canon include Ball, The Play's the Thing: An
Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REv. 81 (i975);
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. I6oz (1986); Posner, Law and Literature: A
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This essay is an effort in that direction. Its subject is Aeschylus'
Oresteia. This trilogy of plays is one of the earliest surviving master-
pieces of Western culture, and it has special meaning for lawyers.
Many of us read the Oresteia in college. But at that point, focusing
on other stories it tells, we may not have appreciated that it is fun-
damentally a story about the emergence of law. Aeschylus' myth,
which links law's emergence to the foundation of our civilization,
presents an image of law that deserves examination - an image of
genuine complexity, power, and modern resonance, an image that law-
trained readers should address as well as the professional classicists
and college undergraduates who are currently the plays' main audi-
ence.
The plot of the Oresteia is a familiar one that found repeated use
among Greek writers. The House of Atreus has long been mired in
wrongdoing and revenge. As the Oresteia opens, Atreus' son Aga-
memnon, King of the Argives, returns home after the ten-year war
with Troy. His wife, Clytemnestra - embittered by Agamemnon's
sacrifice of their daughter Iphigenia at the outset of the Trojan ex-
pedition, and enmeshed in an adulterous relationship with Aegisthus
- kills Agamemnon and his mistress, Cassandra. Orestes, the son of
Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, avenges his father's murder by killing
both Clytemnestra and her lover. The Furies, spirits avenging Cly-
temnestra's death, begin to haunt Orestes, and the cycle of blood
feuds appears endless. Apollo intervenes, however, and sends Orestes
to Athena, who establishes a court and a legal process within Greek
society and puts Orestes on trial. Orestes is acquitted, and the em-
bittered Furies are forestalled from continuing their vendettas by being
offered an honored place within the new social order.
Two aspects of the image of law in the Oresteia are especially
arresting: passion is seen as a central, necessary element of law; and
law is presented as a gendered phenomenon. To explore these aspects
more clearly, though, I must first describe in more detail law's basic
appearance in the plays.
I.
The trial of Orestes is presented as "the first trial of bloodshed," 4
and Athena sees the emergence of this legal forum as an historic
turning point in Greek civilization:
Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1986); and J. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON
THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAw (1985); see also Curtis & Resnik, Images of Justice,
96 YALE L.J. 1727 (1987) (interpreting various portrayals of "Justice" in painting, sculpture and
drawing).
4 THE EUMENIDES, 1. 694, in AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTEIA (R. Fagles trans. 1975) [hereinafter
THE OhESTEIA (Fagles trans.)]. Citations in this essay are to the individual plays in the trilogy:
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[S]ince
the burden of the case is here, and rests on me,
I shall select judges of manslaughter, and swear
them in, establish a court into all time to come.
5
With this case, Athena introduces both a court and a trial process to
replace the endless cycle of blood feuds and revenge - she establishes
a tribunal of law - and she consecrates the site on which this first
trial occurs:
Now and forever more, for Aegeus' people
this will be the court where judges reign.
This is the Crag of Ares ....
Here from the heights, terror and reverence,
my people's kindred powers
will hold them from injustice through the day
and through the mild night. Never pollute
our law with innovations. No, my citizens,
foul a clear well and you will suffer thirst....
Untouched by lust for spoil, this court of law
majestic, swift to fury, rising above you
as you sleep, our night watch always wakeful,
guardian of our land - I found it here and now.
6
This is not to say that Athena introduces justice, for throughout
the trilogy the characters have all conceived their claims in terms of
what justice requires. But Athena's innovation has several elements
that set it altogether apart from the system of blood revenge that had
preceded it - elements that we take for granted today almost as
defining characteristics of a system of law.
Athena's court is public and political; by contrast, the regime it
seeks to replace is private and familial, with aggrieved family mem-
bers taking direct action themselves. Moreover, Athena's system in-
volves a process - an orderly and controlled process for hearing
claims, rather than uncontrolled violence. Specifically, the system
introduces a decisionmaker standing apart from the immediately in-
terested parties: a judge presides, and there is a lay jury. (Although
Athena herself presides in Orestes' case and casts the deciding vote
when the lay jury divides, the new system is clearly to be embedded
in Greek civil society and implemented by mortals; law may express
the will of the gods, but it is an activity of humans.) This process
involves reasoned discussion. The complainant and the accused pres-
Agamemnon, The Libation Bearers, and The Eumenides. I have found it useful to quote
sometimes from Robert Fagles' translation and sometimes from Richmond Lattimore's AEscHY-
LUS I: ORESTEIA (R. Lattimore trans. 1953) [hereinafter ORESTEIA (Lattimore trans.)].
5 THE EUMENIDES (Lattimore trans.) 11. 481-84.
6 Id. (Fagles trans.) at 11. 695-721.
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ent "witnesses" and "proofs." 7 They appeal to rights, and they reason
from abstract principles. Principles of justice had been invoked even
under the regime of blood feuds, but only as explanations for private
acts of revenge. Now there is open debate about which principles are
appropriate, and a third party decides. The movement is from a
world of passion and subjectivity toward a regime that, in form at
least, empowers a more detached authority influenced by reason.
The process is also influenced by the aspiration for a wise resolu-
tion of conflict. The pervasive sense of closure achieved at the play's
end is linked to the possibility of closure that a legal judgment pro-
vides. Before law - without courts - there is revenge after revenge,
a cycle of violence without end. This, as the Oresteia exposes, is the
inner contradiction of revenge: it does not stop. With law, there is
the possibility of an ending, both in individual cases and in systemic
struggles. The establishment of Athena's court and legal process be-
comes the central event that propels the action toward the transfigur-
ing harmonies of the play's close.
H.
Law's image in the Oresteia gains its richness, though, from other
features. The most basic feature is the place of the Furies in the
system. Although they consent to participate in the trial, the very
establishment of the court seems to displace their method of revenge.
After the Furies lose the case against Orestes, they announce that they
will "let loose on the land ... vindictive poison."8 Athena, however,
pleads with them to take an honored place within the community,
and after considerable resistance they finally agree.
How is one to understand Athena's offer to include and empower
the Furies in the new social order? The starting point is to appreciate
what the Furies are and what they represent: complex forces of pas-
sion, linked at various points in the plays with vengeance, fear, anger,
violence, conscience, instinct, the sense of hurt, memories of grief, the
primitive, the emotional and nonrational.
One might view Athena's effort to include these forces of Fury
simply as an act of political necessity. Excluded, the Furies threaten
to wreak havoc. Since the Furies and the emotional forces they
represent will have some role one way or another, inclusion is a tactic
to spare Athens the wrath of a Fury spurned.
This understanding, however, fails to take account of the positive
function that Aeschylus clearly sees the Furies playing in the new
order. There is more than political manipulation in Athena's state-
7 Id. (Lattimore trans.) at 1. 485.
8 Id. at 11. 781-82.
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ments that the Furies will be "honored" and will provide "salvation
for your citadel." 9 The Furies have this stature because they actually
contribute to the system Athena is establishing. What the Furies most
clearly represent - call it fear, conscience, vengeance - is not a
"threat" to law in the Oresteia's scheme. Rather, Fury is law's partner.
It reinforces a respect for legal rights. It promotes "reverence for the
just,"' 0 which in turn is a source of society's prosperity. From the
moment she announces the new legal order, Athena advises her citi-
zens
not to cast fear utterly from your city. What
man who fears nothing at all is ever righteous? Such
be your just terrors, and you may deserve and have
salvation for your citadel .... 11
Here she echoes the Furies themselves, who warn:
There are times when fear is good.
It must keep its watchful place
at the heart's controls. 12
This, then, is Aeschylus' large claim about law: law and passion
are inseparable. The Furies are "steering spirits of law."'1 3 A stable
law is rooted in passion, and does not transcend it. At the trilogy's
end, the Furies are included, but they are not transformed into gentle
spirits or agents of reason. As Athena says: "I establish in power
spirits who are large, difficult to soften." 14 They remain fearsome
forces, but Athena proclaims that "[i]n the terror upon the faces of
these I see great good for our citizens."' 5 The Furies change by
putting their energies in the service of Zeus' goals, but their transfor-
mation is from Furies as a "rampaging force" to Furies as a "steering"
force of law, a change that does not abolish their primitive energies
but channels them and makes an effective law possible.
This explains what the Furies mean when, toward the end of the
play, they pray for "hate with one strong heart: such union heals a
thousand ills of man."' 6 Channeled through law, vengeance and hate
speak through the one strong voice of civil authority. Only with this
vehicle for hate can the play achieve its resolution and civilization
move ahead. Thus, the Oresteia stands behind those in contemporary
debates who insist that retribution must play a central role in a system
9 Id. at 11. 701, 868.
10 Id. (Fagles trans.) at 1. 714.
11 Id. (Lattimore trans.) at 11. 698-701.
12 Id. at 11. 517-19.
13 Id. at 1. 961; see id. at 1. 993.
14 Id. at 11. 928-29.
Is Id. at 11. 99o-9!.
16 Id. (Fagles trans.) at 11. 995-96.
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of criminal justice and who warn that if retributive emotions are
ignored they will be unleashed in less acceptable ways. Inclusion of
the Furies suggests this channeling function of law, and in the play's
terms that is an advance. But the blissful harmonies of the play's
close should not mask the basic truths that the foundation of the new
legal order is hate as much as concern, and that law becomes an
instrument of violence not its replacement. The Furies' role under-
scores the connection of the legal order to terror and violence.
This does not mean, of course, that the Furies come to represent
what law is. Professor Hugh Lloyd-Jones misreads the play, I think,
when he says that "Athena chooses to institute a new court . . . to
assist the [Furies]."'1 7 Athena's establishment of the court precedes
the inclusion of the Furies in the system, and the basic process and
rational method of the new legal order is a radical departure from the
cycle of vendettas that the Furies have represented. Within the terms
of the play, moreover, it is clear that Athena would persist with her
new institution even if the Furies rebelled. The Furies come to assist
the new social order, not vice versa.
The Furies bring more to the legal system than fear. Along with
fear, which contributes to order, they bring pain, which contributes
to wisdom - that most essential attribute of those who judge. In
pressing their claims, the Furies not only counsel that "there are times
when fear is good" but also speak of the "advantage in the wisdom
won from pain."' 8 The Furies thereby echo the vision of tragic un-
derstanding articulated by the chorus in Agamemnon, perhaps the
most famous lines in the Oresteia:
[W]isdom
comes alone through suffering.
Still there drips in sleep against the heart
grief of memory; against
our pleasure we are temperate.
From the gods who sit in grandeur
grace comes somehow violent. 19
The Furies (elsewhere linked to "memories of grief" 20 ) become
agents in the legal order for the kind of understanding that passes
what reason alone can provide. The Furies are not "emotion" to the
exclusion of "reason" - indeed, they are at least Apollo's equal in
offering reasoned arguments to Athena - but they do represent more
emotional forces in life and in law. Through the Furies, law is
strengthened by terror; legal judgment is ripened by pain; and a cluster
17 H. LLOYD-JONES, THE JUSTICE OF ZEUS 95 (2d ed. 1983) (emphasis added).
18 THE EUMENIDES (Lattimore trans.) ]l. 520-21.
19 AGAMEMNON (Lattimore trans.) 11. 177-83.
20 THE EUMENIDES (Fagles trans.) 1. 393.
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of emotions are infused into the legal order as a source of fruitful,
and at times disturbing, social action and understanding.
In short, the inclusion of the Furies must be seen as a challenge
to any view that reason rules in law's domain. In our time, though,
advocates for reason's preeminent role in law remain ascendant vir-
tually everywhere, from the development of highly rationalized sen-
tencing guidelines, to the adamant idealizing of much constitutional
theory, to the currently prominent law-and-economics movement. The
Legal Realists of the 192o's and 1930's may have smashed the ration-
alist conceptualism of Langdell, but their heirs have typically devel-
oped approaches that reflect as deep a faith in the presiding powers
of reason. Indeed, it is common in legal analysis to draw a sharp line
between reason and emotion, as if the line were a clear one and as if
the law's domain properly excluded emotion. Only last Term in the
Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor wrote that a jury's decision whether
to impose the death penalty
should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's back-
ground, character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or emo-
tion .... [T]he individualized assessment of the appropriateness of
the death penalty is a moral inquiry into the culpability of the
defendant, and not an emotional response to the mitigating
evidence . ... 21
Aeschylus reveals a more haunting view of law: law is not and cannot
be an enterprise of reason alone; it includes the nonrational emotions
as an essential and central ingredient. Law may be in part - perhaps
in largest part - a process of reasoned judgment, but it also engages
forces beyond reason, like most other things in life.
It is foolish and perhaps dangerous, in this view, to imagine that
law can or should be made perfectly rational. In part, nonrational
forces have a place in law simply because "law's terrain (and the
lawyer's terrain) must be the realities of life, in all their tangled
complexity. '22 Every actual society contains forces that undercut log-
ical models and clear lines of authority. The world resists - or, more
accurately, resistance is part of law's world 23 - and what we end up
with can rarely be reason's design alone. There is harsh conflict and
imperfect compromise everywhere; reconciliation or coherence among
social forces, to the extent there is any, often comes through mysterious
dynamics and communal rituals of the sort that close the Oresteia.
21 California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 841 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis
omitted) (upholding a jury instruction directing the jury not to be "swayed by mere sentiment,
conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling" in deciding whether
to impose the death penalty).
22 Gewirtz, A Lawyer's Death, ioo HARV. L. REV. 2053, 2055 (1987).
23 See Gewirtz, supra note 2, at 6o8-og.
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To use law effectively, we must be prepared to deal with those real-
ities. We can improve law to serve our purposes, but we cannot
expect an operating system of law to deliver all that can be imagined
by our largest capacities for reason.
Nor is reason the only thing of value in a legal system. Undeni-
ably, the goal of giving a more rational direction to human life is
indispensable. But while the nonrational emotions can distort, delude,
or blaze uncontrollably, they have worth in themselves and can also
open, clarify, and enrich understanding. The values and achievements
of a legal system - and of lawyers, judges, and citizens involved
with a legal system - are shaped by what the emotions yield.
Whether or not one is comfortable with Aeschylus' particular claim
that the emotion of fear is indispensable to the legal order, this broader
meaning of the Furies' inclusion in the legal order remains - and it
is important to keep this meaning alive as the rationalist impulses in
law drive ahead ever more insistently.
These observations suggest one important connection between lit-
erature and law that is rarely made explicit. Literature makes its
special claims upon us precisely because it nourishes the kinds of
human understanding not achievable through reason alone but in-
volving intuition and feeling as well. 24 If, as the Oresteia suggests,
law engages nonrational elements and requires the most comprehen-
sive kinds of understanding, literature can play an important part in
a lawyer's development. The inclusion of the Furies within the legal
order - an inclusion that represents the linking of emotional spheres
to law - links literature itself to law and underscores the special
place literature can have in developing the legal mind to its fullest
richness and complexity.
mI.
An equally striking feature about the image of law in the Oresteia
is that law is portrayed as a highly gendered phenomenon. Gender's
role is pervasive in the trilogy.25 Clytemnestra is frequently described
as manlike, and her lover "like a woman."26 The Furies are pointedly
all women. The members of the lay jury are all men. Apollo seeks
to distinguish Orestes' murder of his mother from Clytemnestra's mur-
der of her husband by arguing that a father's death is different from
a mother's. The mother, Apollo says, is "no parent" but only a "nurse
24 See L. TRILLING, THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION at ix (195o).
25 For a catalogue of the various sexual conflicts in the Oresteia, see D.J. CONACHER,
AESCHYLUS' ORESTEIA: A LITERARY COMMENTARY 206-I2 (1987), and M. GAGARIN, AESCHY-
LEAN DRAMA 87-105 (1976).
26 AGAMEMNON (Lattimore trans.) 1. r625; see THE LIBATION BEARERS (Lattimpre trans.)
I. 304-05 ("since his heart is female").
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of the [father's] seed .... The parent is he who mounts."2 7 Athena
is a virgin goddess who has renounced marriage. And her own jus-
tification for voting in favor of Orestes' acquittal also seems to have
a gender basis:
There is no mother anywhere who gave me birth,
and, but for marriage, I am always for the male
with all my heart, and strongly on my father's side.
So, in a case where the wife has killed her husband, lord
of the house, her death shall not mean most to me. 28
What is one to make of the role that gender plays in the trilogy?
The strongest currents may well come from Greek religious mythology,
in which male gods replaced female ones as the dominant rulers of
the universe. But the role of gender in the Oresteia must also be
understood within the main terms of the play itself, and therefore one
must ask: what is gender's connection to the emergence of law?
Once again, the place of the Furies in relation to the legal order
seems most basic. Aeschylus portrays the Furies as a female force.
Most obviously, of course, they are female and identify with the
female. In addition, the Furies are the ones insisting upon a place
for emotions - emotions of hurt and anger and terror, emotions they
have been playing out within the blood relations of the family sphere.
The emotions, as well as the family sphere, have conventionally been
associated with the "female" (although terror itself has not).29 Within
27 THE EUMENIDES (Lattimore trans.) 11. 659-60. Apollo's argument bears a striking resem-
blance to an unusual argument that surfaced in a more recent case challenging, under the equal
protection clause, the constitutionality of California's statutory rape law, which punished males
but not females for engaging in sexual intercourse with persons under 18 years old. See Michael
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (198). In upholding the California law, the Supreme Court
of the United States noted without disapproval that the California Supreme Court had justified
the law "[b]ecause males alone can 'physiologically cause the result [pregnancy] which the law
properly seeks to avoid.'" Id. at 467 (quoting Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 6o8,
611, 6oi P.2d 572, 574 (1979)).
28 THE EUMENIDES (Lattimore trans.) 11. 736-4o. Athena's vote, however, does not neces-
sarily reflect a sweeping gender-based principle. It is when a wife has already killed her husband
that her murder does not mean "most" to Athena. Moreover, Athena seems to say that her vote
was not based on a general favoritism towards males, but instead on allegiance to her father,
Zeus, who was behind Orestes' act. As Athena later explains to the Furies:
You were not
dishonored, but the luminous evidence of Zeus
was there, and he who spoke the oracle was he
who ordered Orestes so to act and not be hurt.
Id. at I1. 796-99. Of course, even if Athena's judgment could be explained entirely on the basis
of personal allegiance rather than her identification with "the male," it is significant that this
sort of subjectivity emerges within an ostensibly detached decisionmaking process.
29 For a striking recent representation of the Furies as agents passing judgment on the harsh
history of women, see A. RICH, From An Old House in America, stanza 15, in THE FACT OF
A DOORFRAME 221 (1984).
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the scheme of the play, the Furies embody the female, or at least a
version of the female.
The legal regime, on the other hand, is otherwise predominantly
male. The day-to-day apparatus of the system, such as the lay jury,
is all male; and the god of law, Apollo, is male. To be sure, Athena
is female - a fact that undercuts any gender simplicities about the
play30 - but Athena is female of a particularly androgynous sort: a
warrior, and one who "identifies with the male in all things" and
utilizes decidedly pro-male decision rules as a judge. In addition to
these explicitly male features, the legal regime emphasizes reason,
public process, closure - things often associated with the "male."
31
Simplified a bit, then, the gendered scheme of the play is that the
legal order, essentially male, displaces but then comes to include the
female.
Finding suggestions of all this in the Oresteia is rather startling in
light of the work of some feminists today that seeks to construct a
critique of law as fundamentally expressing a male perspective, 32 and
in light of other contemporary arguments that the legal culture dis-
advantages and devalues the women included within it. 33 It is worth
looking a little closer, therefore, at what "inclusion" of the female
means here. Myths illuminate origins, as well as present circum-
stances; and the effort to see clearly the world that literature reveals
both measures and trains our ability to see clearly the rest of the
world around us.
In the play's scheme, the alternative to inclusion is the Furies
marginalized - remaining a roving band of vengeful females harass-
ing the city and perpetuating blood feuds, or becoming permanent
exiles. There is no doubt that Aeschylus portrays the solution of
30 Athena's large role highlights the quite limited role played by the male god, Apollo.
Although Apollo is the god typically associated with law and civilization in Greek mythology,
his role is surely no greater than Athena's in establishing the new system; in fact, he says
nothing at all in the play after the verdict is announced, during the all-important phase when
the status of the Furies within the legal order is being clarified.
31 Carol Gilligan contrasts the male voice on moral questions, which tends to emphasize
rights and individuation, with the female voice, which tends to emphasize the emotion of care
and the web of social connection. See generally C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
32 See, e.g., MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward a Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983); Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 294 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983); see also Karst, Woman's Constitution,
1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role
of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAw, supra, at 117.
33 See, e.g., C. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (1981); Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women:
Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REv. 55, 6o-6i (i979); Menkel-Meadow,
Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, i BERKELEY WOM-
EN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 15 (1986).
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inclusion as far better. The play's forces are harmonized and resolved
only when the female comes to be included - only when the male
perspective and female perspective each secures a place of high honor,
each contributing to the social order.
For all the ritualized harmony, though, the question remains
whether this is a myth of gender reconciliation or really one of female
subordination. 3 4 It is a mistake, I think, to focus exclusively on the
Furies' displacement and loss at Orestes' trial, without taking account
of their inclusion at the trilogy's end. But the gathering harmonies of
the play's close should not blind us to the undercurrents that remind
us that gendered relations almost always involve issues of power. For
one thing, coercion shapes the Furies' inclusion. The terms of inclu-
sion are crafted by Athena, who has just ruled against the Furies.
Her argument to the Furies, which reads almost like a seduction, 3 5 is
that they can have a place of honor; and she proclaims at the play's
end that "persuasion" has led to a consensual resolution in which the
Furies agree to come on board. 3 6 But Athena has backed her argu-
ments all along with threats of (male) violence:
I have Zeus behind me. Do
we need to speak of that? I am the only god
who know[s] the keys to where his thunderbolts are locked.
We do not need such, do we?
3 7
34 Recent commentators have read the play in very different ways. Compare M. GAGARIN,
supra note 25, at 104-o5 ("Male and female elements, which have been in conflict since before
the beginning of Agamemnon, are thus reconciled at the end of Eumenides. Sexual harmony is
established at last.") and Fagles, The Serpent and the Eagle, in AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTEIA
(R. Fagles trans.) 75-76 ("[Tlhe Oresteia culminates in a union of male and female strengths, a
healthy unisexuality of the spirit .... It declares the power of the feminine; it insists that the
masculine alone is myopic and destructive.") with K. MILLET, SEXUAL POLITICS 11S (1970)
("Athena cajole[s] the Furies out of their rage and into an ancillary role within the new order
.... [S]he coaxes the Furies into a bargain which appears to afford them no benefits beyond
survival .... [P]atriarchy .. . come[s] off triumphant.") and Zeitlin, The Dynamics of Miso-
gyny: Myth and Mythmaking in the Oresteia, ii ARETHUSA 149, i50 (1978) ("[T]he cornerstone
of [Aeschylus'] architecture is the control of woman, the social and cultural prerequisite for the
construction of civilization. The Oresteia stands squarely within the misogynistic tradition which
pervades Greek thought .... ").
David Luban, in a highly interesting recent article that came to my attention after this essay
was completed, makes a rare attempt to link the Oresteia's treatment of gender with a conception
of law: "Aeschylus means us to perceive the trial of Orestes as manifestly unfair .... The
Eumenides presents an instrumentalist conception of legal argument and legal institutions ....
[I]n the name of prosperity and peace, an unjust verdict converts women into a permanent
underclass of society." Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod, Aes-
chylus and Plato, 54 TENN. L. REv. 279, 311-13 (1987).
3s Indeed, Athena's "persuasion" of the Furies to enter the new order is not unlike the
passage in which Clytemnestra, another manlike woman, lures Agamemnon into the house to
be murdered. See AGAMEMNON (Lattimore trans.) 11. 905-74.
36 THE EUMENIDES (Lattimore trans.) 11. 970-72.
37 Id. at 11. 826-29.
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In addition, the Furies clearly give up something in order to be
included. They do receive honor and are told that "[n]o household
shall be prosperous without your will." 38 But their exclusive jurisdic-
tion has been clipped. Although the fear, vengeance, and other pas-
sions that they represent are given a central place in the new order,
the Furies' elemental "wild[ness]"39 has been somewhat tamed. For
the first time in the trilogy, the Furies call Zeus "all powerful";40 they
put their energies in the service of Zeus' goals. For all their honor,
the Furies are called "guests of the state." 41 In short, although the
system of law in the Oresteia incorporates the female and may even
make female forces its steering spirits, the Furies lose something in
this transformation. They may receive honor and devotions "for the
rest of time, '42 but for the most part they will serve the younger gods
and a largely male regime.
43
The drive for sex equality in our time, both within law and within
the larger community, has largely focused on securing women's inclu-
sion within institutions that were established predominantly for men.
The Oresteia can be seen as a myth of inclusion: an affirmation that
law is incomplete without the female perspective, an affirmation of
the necessary and central role of the "female" within law. But in
Aeschylus' myth, the included female assumes an inferior place in the
hierarchy. Thus, in the end, the, gendered myth of the Oresteia is
one that contains female privilege and female subordination within
the legal order, a combination that we know can be insidious. 44 In
significant part, today's women's movement contends with the per-
sistence of such stories. The current debate has largely moved beyond
the question whether women should be included to questions about
what the terms of inclusion should be. Is it enough if the traditional
norms of traditionally male institutions are applied with true even-
handedness to women and men? Do these seemingly neutral norms
express a "male" point of view and disadvantage women for that
reason - suggesting that perhaps the norms themselves should change
38 Id. at 1. 895.
39 Id. at 1. 972.
40°Id. at 1. 918.
41 Id. at 1. ioui.
42 Id. at 1. 898.
43 The Furies' subordinate status may provoke different responses depending upon which
aspect of the Furies' role is emphasized. To the extent that the Furies represent certain
nonrational forces, their inclusion with subordinate status is not especially troubling. To the
extent that the Furies represent a version of the "female," their inclusion as subordinates has a
harsher ring to modem ears. This tension arises in part, of course, because Aeschylus locates
the female and the nonrational in the same entities.
44 "The pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon closer inspec-
tion, been revealed as a cage." Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20, 485 P.2d 529, 541
(1971).
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to accommodate a "female" perspective as equally valid? Such ques-
tions obviously move far beyond what the Oresteia addresses. But a
reader today is encouraged to reflect upon them as the Oresteia tells
its double-edged myth - affirming the indispensable importance of
the female for law, yet locating the female in a subordinate place. As
in other contexts, modern feminism has opened up new ways of
hearing old tales.
IV.
A modern-day lawyer has almost a sense of awe in rediscovering
an ancient literary masterpiece that contains such a richly evocative
image of law. Judging, like system-building itself, is seen as pervaded
with difficulties - among them the tension between the goal of rea-
soned judgment, which Athena proclaims, and the pull of personal
allegiance, to which Athena in the end succumbs. 45 More fundamen-
tally, at the very beginning of our tradition Aeschylus sees through to
the complexity of the legal order's basic enterprise. Law is blessed in
these plays as a great advance for civilization, but the system of law
at its origin is tangled in a cluster of contradictions and clashing
dualities: linked to the divine, but inescapably human; aspiring to
objectivity, but finding subjectivity unavoidable; shaping the future,
but tied irrevocably to the past; predominantly male, but steered by
the female; following the cadence of reason, yet also the rhythm of
terror. The image endures.
45 See, e.g., THE EUMENIDES (Lattimore trans.) 11. 735-38; supra note 28.
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